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Technical Change, Non-Tariff Barriers, 
and the Development of the Italian 
Locomotive Industry, 1850–1913
CARLO CICCARELLI AND ALESSANDRO NUVOLARI
The locomotive industry was one of the relatively sophisticated “high tech” 
sectors in which Italy, a late industrializer, was successful before 1913. Using 
technical data on the performance of different vintages of locomotives, we 
construct a new industry-level index of technical change. We also study the 
impact of different policy instruments (import duties, non-tariff trade barriers, 
and other discretionary interventions) in shaping the development of the industry. 
Our reassessment reveals not only the sound technological performance of Italian 
locomotives and successful industry growth, but also the critical role played by 
non-tariff barriers for the development of the industry. 
The relationship between the adoption of new technologies in devel-oping countries and comparative economic development continues 
to generate considerable research in economics and economic history.1 
In his work, Alexander Gerschenkon noted that the “technology gap” 
with respect to the technological frontier provides developing countries 
with the opportunity to quickly absorb the “backlog of technological 
innovations” of advanced countries and catch up with them (1962, p. 
8). This process of international technology diffusion is purported to 
be at the root of convergence with Britain by several European coun-
tries during the nineteenth century (Landes 1969). However, catching 
up is by no means automatic. Rather, it requires a signi?cant mobiliza-
tion of resources, skills, and capitals over a broad front, often coupled 
with a complex “mix” of policy interventions towards infant industries, 
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ranging from trade and industrial policies to other forms of government 
actions.2 
In his assessment of the policy mix adopted by Italian governments 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, Gerschenkron was char-
acteristically blunt, pointing to a generalized “ineptness of government 
industrialization policies.” In particular, he argued that Italian industri-
alization would have bene?ted from a more “rationally conceived and 
executed tariff.” The structure of the tariff, favoring iron and steel in a 
coal-less country, represented a major impediment to the development of 
the Italian mechanical engineering industry, which “was largely left to 
its own devices” (Gerschenkron 1962, pp. 80–83). Other historians have 
instead argued that the sluggish development of the industry lay in the 
overall “technical and organizational backwardness of the sector” and 
not in mistaken policies.3
This article sheds new light on these issues by reassessing the case 
of the steam locomotive industry, one of the few relatively “high tech” 
sectors in which Italy was successful before 1913. The development 
of this industry was shaped by a complex mix of policies comprising 
trade policies, “non-tariff trade barriers,” and other discretionary inter-
ventions. The locomotive industry, thus, constitutes a useful vantage 
point to reconsider the general effectiveness of the different types of 
interventions adopted by the Italian governments in the period 1850– 
1913. 
Our analysis relies on a new index of technical change based on tech-
nical indicators of the performance of different vintages of steam loco-
motives. The dataset includes some six thousand steam locomotives 
in operation in Italy from 1839 to 1913. The index casts doubt on the 
prevailing view that the market share of Italian steam locomotive manu-
facturers was severely limited by their technical backwardness. On the 
contrary, the new quantitative evidence on technical change suggests that 
the technical capabilities of Italian producers were fully adequate when 
compared to those of foreign producers. Ef?cient production required 
then an annual production of about 50 locomotives per ?rm. Tariff-based 
protectionism, with positive net protection in force since the mid-1880s, 
was not suf?cient to reach this goal. Rather, this production level was 
2 For a recent compact treatment see Allen (2011). For a classical analysis of the case of South 
Korea, see Amsden  (1989). 
3 According to Toniolo (1977, p. 672), a more favorable tariff could have resulted in an increase 
of some 50 percent of the output of the mechanical engineering industry, which in turn would 
have amounted to an increase of some 7 percent in aggregate industrial production in 1908. 
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achieved through speci?c procurement policies assuring regular orders to 
national producers. It was these non-tariff barriers that played a critical 
role for the development of the Italian locomotive industry. 
THE STEAM LOCOMOTIVE INDUSTRY IN ITALY:  
BACKGROUND
At the point of political uni?cation of Italy in 1861, the railway network 
was limited with about 3,900 km in 1864, against 18,000 km in the United 
Kingdom, 16,000 km in Germany, and 12,000 km in France and the 
system had an eminently local character, as a result of the uncoordinated 
investments of the different pre-unitarian states in railway infrastructure. 
Political uni?cation provided a major stimulus towards the expansion of 
the network, so that by 1910 the network comprised about 15,300 km. 
However, even after uni?cation, various sections of the network were 
operated by several private franchise companies. A major reorganization 
took place in 1885 with “Railways Conventions” assigning the manage-
ment of the network to three major private franchise companies under a 
renewable contract: the Rete Adriatica (RA) and the Rete Mediterranea 
(RM) covering the peninsula along a west-east divide, and, the Rete 
Sicula (RS), operating in Sicily.4 In 1905 the operation of the railway 
network was nationalized and taken over by the Ferrovie dello Stato (a 
big state-owned company with about 100,000 workers).   
Debates on Italian industrialization initially focused on the relation 
between railway extension and market uni?cation (Romeo 1959; Sereni 
1966), and on the connection between the development of the railway 
network, the demand for industrial products, and the rate of economic 
growth (Gerschnekron 1962). To date, the most comprehensive economic 
appraisal of the relation between railroads and industrial growth in post-
Uni?cation Italy is Stefano Fenoaltea (1983, 2011). Fenoaltea’s appraisal 
points to the importance of the composition of investment. From 1861–
1895, investment was devoted to construction of railway tracks (mostly 
using unskilled workers for earthworks and related activities) with a 
relatively reduced share (10 percent) devoted to the purchase of metal-
making or engineering products. From 1896–1913, the share of invest-
ment devoted to engineering products rose to about 30 percent of the 
total annual railway investment. Most importantly, maintenance (both 
4 For a more detailed outline of the historical evolution of the railway system in Italy, see the 
online Appendix, and reference therein.
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of railway lines and of rolling stock) grew throughout this period so that 
by 1913 it was such that, “on a value added basis, the maintenance of 
[rolling stock] was as important as their initial fabrication and, unlike 
the latter, it was immune from foreign competition” (Fenoaltea 1983, 
p. 49).
From an engineering standpoint, the steam locomotive is a sophisti-
cated piece of equipment, comprising hundreds of parts, most of them 
requiring accurate manufacturing and processing. Philip Scranton (1997, 
p. 99) regards steam locomotives as a quintessential example of nine-
teenth century “specialty production”: “no specialty product was then 
more complicated than a railway engine and few were as heavily taxed in 
use.” Mass production was not feasible: steam locomotives were manu-
factured in small batches and they often had to incorporate particular 
speci?cations requested by individual customers. This meant that loco-
motive manufacturers had to marshal a signi?cant breadth of engineering 
competences and skills. Even if the broad contours of locomotive design 
were established by the 1850s, throughout the second one-half of the 
nineteenth century, steam locomotives underwent a stream of technical 
improvements, which compelled a continuous revision and updating of 
many details of locomotives design and manufacturing.5  
For these reasons, the steam locomotive provides an interesting 
perspective on the absorption of an “advanced” technology by latecomer 
countries. In comparative perspective, it is possible to distinguish two 
main “waves” in the international diffusion of the steam locomotive. 
During the ?rst wave (1830–1860), the manufacturing of steam locomo-
tives became established in England, Belgium, France, United States, and 
Germany. During the second wave (1880–1920), we witness the emer-
gence, with varying success, of the manufacturing of steam locomotives 
in Italy, Russia, Spain, and Japan.6  
5 See Sinclair (1907). According to Greggio and Kalla-Bishop (1985, p. 99), “It was not 
until 1890 that fundamental design theory could be said to be settled, for what was decided 
then lasted until the end of steam.” Analogously, Cardwell (1994, p. 348) regards the end of 
the nineteenth century as the moment in which the locomotive had reached “a point of near- 
perfection.” 
6 The domestic production of steam locomotives in Spain remained limited until WWI. See 
Comín et al. (1998) and Cayón García and Muñoz Rubio (2005). On the more successful Japanese 
case, see Ericson (1998). In the Italian case, the production of steam locomotives has been 
investigated by Merger (1986, 1989), and, more recently, by Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2012). 
The works by Merger are mainly concerned with the production of national manufacturers in 
quantitative terms and do not consider in detail the technological performance of the different 
models of locomotives. Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2012) present annual estimates for the rail-
guided vehicles industry both at the national and regional level. 
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THE STEAM LOCOMOTIVE INDUSTRY IN ITALY:  
NEW EVIDENCE, NEW CONJECTURES
The evidence presented in this article is largely based on a new dataset 
described in the Appendix. It comprises two major components. The 
?rst one includes information on 5,700 locomotives, both domestic and 
foreign. For each locomotive we know the year and place of production, 
the producer’s name, and a numerical identi?er. The second component 
is based on the authoritative handbook by Giovanni Cornolò (1998) 
providing technical characteristics and performances of the locomotives 
for the period 1850–1913. By combining these two components we can 
chart in detail the technological characteristics of the different locomo-
tives operating in each year.
The Process of Import-Substitution
The development of Italy’s locomotive market is described in Figure 
1 and Table 1 illustrating both the total number of locomotives and those 
produced domestically. 
Until mid-1880s, domestic production was limited and the market 
was dominated by foreign manufacturers. The Italian import market was 
initially dominated by English producers, then by French producers, 
and ?nally by German manufacturers for whom, the Italian market was 
particularly signi?cant. The Maschinenfabrik Esslingen, among the 
leading German producer of steam locomotives, exported during the 
period 1883–1887 about one-half of its production in Italy (Hertner 1984, 
p. 30). Furthermore, as noted by Albert Schram (1997, p. 61) German 
banks backed the Rete Mediterranea, and the Railways Conventions 
of 1885 marked the beginning of German investments in Italy. During 
the 1890s few locomotives were purchased, but after 1900, demand 
resumed with Italian producers substantially increasing their market 
share. 
Using data on the number of locomotives, Michèle Merger (1986, 
1989) argues that the limited production of Italian manufacturers during 
the period 1861–1885 is due to three concomitant factors: the limited 
depth of technological capabilities of national ?rms, a lack of specializa-
tion leading to increasing costs, and the penalties induced by the tariff 
on iron. After 1885, with the new Railways Conventions, a new wave of 
investments took place. In this phase Merger argues that the increased 
domestic production was a result of the public policies favoring national 
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manufacturers, in particular Pietrarsa, Ansaldo, and Breda.7 The ultimate 
consolidation of the national industry of steam locomotives, according 
to Merger, takes place after 1905 when the production of private 
national producers is elicited by a new wave of investment following the 
creation of Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), the new public operating company 
managing the entire main network (including both new construction and 
maintenance of the railway lines, and the maintenance of rolling stock). 
However, the increase in the number of domestically-produced locomo-
tives tells us little about their technical quality. 
Patterns of Technical Change
We assess the dynamics of technical change using the traditional 
weight-to-power (whp) ratio, a synthetic indicator that is widely used in 
7 These companies had been able to develop a certain base of engineering capabilities in 
locomotive building by virtue of different channels of knowledge transfer (recruitment of foreign 
personnel, travels abroad, and licensing of foreign patents), see Merger (1986) and Vasta (2002). 
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the engineering literature and represents “a clear expression of technical 
progress” in steam locomotives (Diegoli 1961, p. 114). The whp ratio 
provides a measurement of the performance of the locomotive in a metric 
which is independent of its size, facilitating thus comparisons across 
different models and designs.8 For each locomotive we computed the 
whp ratio using the data from Cornolò (1998). The whp ratio represents, 
therefore, our proxy for the technical performance of the various “types” 
of locomotive, with lower values denoting better performance and thus 
improved technology.9 The different “types” of locomotives (Gruppi FS) 
were classi?ed in 1905 by the engineers of the newborn Ferrovie dello 
Stato. Locomotives belonging to the same group are very similar in terms 
of technical characteristics. As Appendix A details, our sample includes 
more than 100 Gruppi FS. We construct an industry-level index (WHP) 
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED ACQUISITIONS OF STEAM LOCOMOTIVES:  














1850–1860    80     9    71 11 89
1861–1870   426    53   373 12 88
1871–1880   570   121   449 21 79
1881–1890 1,139   455   684 40 60
1891–1900   337   317    20 94  6
1901–1914 3,148 2,393   755 76 24
1850–1914 5,700 3,348 2,352 59 41
Source: See text.
8 The whp ratio, as any other synthetic indicator of technological performance, has of course 
its own limitations. First, it is a ratio, so it is not directly telling on locomotive weight and power, 
each per se relevant. Second, the whp is not particularly informative on other technological 
characteristics such as, for instance, locomotive top-speed and fuel ef?ciency.
9 An increase in locomotive power (due to the introduction of, say, a bigger boiler) leaving 
unaltered the whp ratio is not interpreted here as technological progress. The whp ratio is a 
performance indicator that seems particularly relevant in the Italian context also because “The 
Italian lines had numerous metal girders of moderate resistance, so the locomotives had to be of 
reduced weight, both per axle and per linear meter; as a consequence [Italian locomotives] were 
forced to have a particularly high power” (Diegoli, 1961, p. 108). From this point of view the 
evolution of Italy’s steam locomotive sector during the nineteenth century can be understood as 
a struggle between the increasing weight of locomotives and rails’—of iron ?rst of steel then—
capability to bear it.
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of technical change as the weighted average of the technical performance 
of the different locomotive types entering in service in that year:10
?
?






where t represents time (year), and sgt = ngt / Nt is the share of locomotive 
of type g introduced in year t, (with ngt and Nt indicating respectively the 
number of locomotives of type g, and the total number of locomotives, 
introduced in year t ); Gt denotes the number of the different types of 
locomotives introduced in year t, and whpg is the weight-to-power ratio 
of locomotives of type g.11
This index comprises only the locomotives introduced in a given year. 
While the sources indicate systematically the year in which a locomo-
tive entered in operation, the information about the year in which it 
was scrapped is not systematic. This prevents us from constructing the 
index for the composition of locomotives in operation in a given year. 
The index of technical change, therefore, should be regarded as an index 
representing the level of technological performance of the investment in 
locomotives in a speci c year. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the WHP index for Italian and foreign 
manufacturers. The area shaded in gray is delimited, year by year, by the 
maximum and minimum sample values of the WHP index. Interestingly 
enough, after 1870, it is not uncommon to nd Italian manufacturers 
among the best performers (locomotives with minimum value of the whp
ratio in each year).
The WHP index is characterized by a decreasing trend, re ecting
technical progress for both domestic and foreign locomotives. The 
rst period (1850–1868) has wide uctuations, which is an outcome of 
the limited sample size. The three decades from 1868 to 1898 shows 
substantial stability, with a rapid acceleration from 1898 to 1913. This 
pattern is not surprising. Railways, in Italy as elsewhere, were rst
laid out across the plains. Conquering the mountains required more 
powerful locomotives and better railway infrastructures, including 
tracks, bridges, and embankments. The rapid acceleration observed 
in this last phase is concomitant with the introduction of two major 
10 Van Dijk and Szirmai (2006) have constructed a similar index of technical progress for the 
Indonesian pulp and paper industry.
11 For example: if Group A includes ten locomotives with a whp index of 90, and Group B 
includes 40 locomotives with a whp of 70, then WHP = 0.2 * 90 + 0.8 * 70 = 74.
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technical innovations: compounding and super-heating (Tey 1910, pp. 
28–36; Diegoli 1961, pp. 108–9), both of which reduced the weight-to-
power ratio. Compounding and super-heating were the key features of 
the “second-generation” of steam locomotives.12 Compound locomotives 
were adopted in 1894 by the Rete Mediterranea and only later by its 
competitor, Rete Adriatica. Table 2 complements Figure 3 by reporting the 
average WHP by decade separately for foreign and domestic producers; 
?gures on the main Italian producers of the time are also reported in 
columns 3–5. 
The evidence presented so far is not consistent with the limited engi-
neering capacity suggested by the prevailing literature (on this point see 
Fenoaltea 2011, p. 150). Rather it supports contemporary views arguing 
that, at least from the late 1870s, Italian manufacturers were indeed 
capable of designing and producing steam locomotives of quality fully 
comparable to that of foreign competitors, or, more precisely, of the 
models of locomotives that English, French, and German manufacturers 
FIGURE 2
THE WEIGHT-TO-POWER INDEX (WHP), 1850–1913
Source: See text.
12 Both innovations can been seen as the response to the threat of the electric locomotives in 
their pioneering phase after 1900.
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were importing in Italy. For example, at a conference for the 1881 Milan 
Exposition, Professor Leonardo Loria stated:
The national locomotives are perfectly equal, both in terms of manufacturing and 
assembling of components, to the best foreign locomotives … . Our locomotives 
are not anymore mere imitation of foreign locomotives, manufactured assembling 
a number of components imported from abroad, rather they are locomotives fully 
adapted to the special conditions of our railway network, almost completely 
manufactured by us, where our engineers introduce important innovations … . 
And, as far as the cost of production is concerned, today we are not far away from 
foreign ?rms. (Loria 1881, pp. 76–77)
Additional corroboration of this point can be found in the detailed 
account of Cornolò who mentions other models of locomotives (such 
as the “Ariosto” or the “Frescot”) designed during the 1870s and early 
1880s that were crowned with critical acclaim at international exhibi-
tions, and in the engineering literature.13
Government Policy 
The domestic production of locomotives increased over the nineteenth 
century. In this section, we examine the impact of government policy 
on the growth of the industry. Interestingly, from 1870 to 1885, several 
TABLE 2














1850–1860 106.25 98.56 98.56 — —
1861–1870  89.64 96.07 98.56 — 92.61
1871–1880  88.02 85.69 87.97 — 85.72
1881–1890  88.63 87.43 85.58 92.35 88.00 
1891–1900  87.00 89.20 91.65 87.81 —
1901–1914  79.14 77.87 78.07 73.63 —
a The table reports the average value of  WHP. The dash denotes missing data in our sample. 
Breda was only created in mid-1880s, Pietrarsa switched from new production to maintenance 
in the 1890s.
Source: See text.
13 See in particular Cornolò (1998, p. 31).
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parliamentary select committees (PSCs) debated alternative forms of 
State intervention to sustain the national industry. Of particular relevance 
here are the early 1870s PSC “on industry,” the late 1870s PSC “on rail-
ways,” and the mid-1880s PSC “on the revision of the trade tariff.” 
The PSC “on industry” (Comitato dell’inchiesta industriale) investi-
gated the capacity to compete with foreign producers and the ways in 
which custom duties increased domestic competitiveness.14 The engi-
neering sector was one of the most debated with many observers and prac-
titioners (including businessmen, managers, and engineers) interviewed. 
The main locomotive producers were Ansaldo (near Genoa, established in 
14 The board was promoted by Luigi Luzzatti, an economist and politician of the time, appointed 
Prime Minister in 1910. Luzzatti and Vittorio Ellena exerted a major in?uence on the diffusion of 
protectionism in Italy through the tariff reforms of 1878 and 1887. Pareto himself used to refer to 
the 1887 protectionist reform as the “Ellena-Luzzatti” tariff (Pareto 1891).
TABLE 3
IMPORT DUTIES IN THE EARLY 1870S: PIETRARSA (NAPLES)
         (1) 
 
 
     Product
     (2) 
 
  Weight 



















  iron (plates) 10,852 0.432  4,688.06 4.62   501.36
  iron (plates)  8,959 0.283  2,533.61 4.62   413.91
 From England:
  fabricated metal 11,022 0.865  9,534.03 11.55 1,273.04
  steel  1,498 0.970  1,453.06 13.86   207.62
  copper  1,580 2.270  3,586.60 13.86   218.99
  bronze    819 2.170  1,777.23  4.62    37.84
  brass tube  3,059 1.820  5,567.38 23.10   706.63
  pig-iron  5,529 0.085    469.97 exempt     0.00
 Total 43,318c — 29,609.94 — 3,359.39
Final product:
 Steam locomotive 40,000c — — 4.00 1,600.00
a Col. 4 = col 3 * col. 2. Once labor costs (21,974.45 lire) and transport costs (2,172.51 lire) are 
included, total costs amount to 53,752 lire. 
b Col. 6 = col. 2 *  col. 5 / 100. 
c The number of kilograms reported in the table (43,318 kg) refers to the  weight of the inputs 
used to build a “standard” locomotive. Given the loss of weight of materials tied to the production 
process (called sfrido in the technical jargon) the ?nal weight of the locomotive is lower than 
43,318 kg. For the sake of simplicity, the sources typically omit to consider the sfrido.  
Source: Comitato dell’inchiesta industriale (1872, p. 58); Camera dei Deputati (1871, p. 112).
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1854) and Pietrarsa (near Naples, established in 1842). They were asked 
about the effects of import duties on the domestic production of steam 
locomotives. Both Ansaldo and Pietrarsa argued that the tariff structure 
worked against the domestic production of locomotives.15 Tables 3 and 
4 reproduce the evidence referring to the Pietrarsa (Naples) and Ansaldo 
(Genoa) workshops.16 
Table 3 reports the cost structure of a typical locomotive of the Pietrarsa 
workshop. Column 2 shows that some 70 percent of a “standard” steam 
locomotive was made of iron, while the remaining 30 percent was of 
pig-iron, brass-tubes, copper, steel, and bronze. Column 4 reports the 
total physical cost of production (excluding labor and transport costs). 
The total cost of materials was 29,610 lire, and 32,970 lire once import 
duties are included (corresponding to a 10 percent increase). The last line 
shows that the import duty on a steam locomotive considered as a ?nished 
product amounted to 4 lire per 100 kg. With a total weight of 40 tons, the 
import duty amounted to 1,600 lire.17 The tariff’s structure, therefore, 
implied an additional cost of 3,360 lire for domestically-produced loco-
motives relative to 1,600 lire for imported locomotives, resulting in a 
negative protection for Italian locomotive producers.
Table 4 reports similar data provided by Ansaldo. For a standard “1858 
Government type” locomotive, the import duties on raw materials were 
2,811 lire, well above the 1,570 lire paid as duty to import the same loco-
motive from abroad. Although the calculations by Ansaldo are extremely 
coarse, they show that in the early 1870s at least one-half of a locomotive 
was made up of highly-protected-iron, amounting to a negative protection. 
The PSC “on industry” concluded that: “there is no balance between 
the (“high”) tariff on iron and the one (“low”) on machines”; therefore “it 
is necessary to reduce the tariff on iron,” or “alternatively, it is necessary 
to raise the tariff on machines” (Comitato della inchiesta industriale 1874, 
p. 6). In fact, both the duties on iron and locomotives were raised over 
time. In the subsequent PSC “on railways” (Commissione d’inchiesta 
sull’esercizio delle ferrovie italiane), Pietro Peirano, a manager of 
15 As already noticed by Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2012), Felice Giordano—in his 1864 appraisal 
of the iron and metal working industry in Italy—argued convincingly that the engineering 
establishments of Naples and Genoa could potentially produce locomotives at prices that were 
similar to that of foreign ones. The argument made by Giordano refers to total cost of production, 
so that while iron was surely more expensive in coal-less Italy, labor was there relatively cheaper 
than in other countries (Giordano 1864, pp. 102, 359).
16 The sources report an import duty on steam locomotives of 4 lire per 100 kg in one case 
(Pietrarsa), and 4.62 lire per 100 kg in the other (Ansaldo). From that evidence one can infer that 
in one case (Pietrarsa) the data refer to some year between 1866 and 1870, while in the other case 
(Ansaldo) to either 1871 or 1872. 
17 Giordano (1864, p. 349) reports an input weight loss that may reach some 25 percent for certain 
materials. As a result, the negative protection illustrated in Tables 3–4 is surely underestimated.
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Ansaldo con?rmed that the key factor forcing  his company to give up 
the production of locomotives was the penalty induced by the tariff rather 
than the lack or backwardness of technological competency.18 Ansaldo 
and Pietrarsa’s delegates were also consulted by the PSC on “the revision 
of international trade tariff” (Commissione d’inchiesta per la revisione 
della tariffa doganale) instituted in the mid-1880s and reaf?rmed that 
the cost of protecting the metal-making sector (with high import duties 
on iron and other production inputs) represented a still too heavy burden 
for the engineering sector.19 
18 Peirano con?dently stated “We could outcompete foreign ?rms if raw materials were 
exempted from import duties.” Even if self-interested, in our view the statement probably 
re?ects a sincere assessment. In the same interview it is also discussed the special procurement 
policy practiced by Ferrovie Meridionali in favour of Pietrarsa. Clearly, if Peirano had not been 
intimately convinced of the critical role of the tariff, the best course of action would have been 
to advocate for the extension of a similar procurement policy rather than the revision of the tariff 
(Commissione d’inchiesta sull’esercizio delle ferrovie italiane 1879, pp. 371–72).
19 Commissione d’inchiesta per la revisione della tariffa doganale (1886, pp. 423–33).
TABLE 4
IMPORT DUTIES IN THE EARLY 1870S: ANSALDO (GENOA)
        (1) 
 
     Product
          (2) 
      Weight 
           (kg)
(3) 
Unit Import Duty 
(lire/100kg)
(4) 
Total Import Dutyc  
(lire)
Inputs: 
 iron (bars) 20,000  4.62   924.30
 copper (fused)  1,500  4.62    69.30
 copper (bars)    560 13.86    77.62
 copper (plates)  1,475  9.24   136.29 
 copper (layers)    400  9.24    36.96
 tin (rods)    200  9.24    18.48
 steel (bars)    500 13.86    69.30
 steel for wheels  3,225 23.10   744.97
 steel for springs    990 34.45   344.03
 brass (tubes)  1,670 23.10   385.77
 brass (for seals)     60  9.24     5.55
 pig-iron  3,450 exempt     0.00
Total 34,030 — 2,811.28
Final product:
 Steam locomotive 34,030  4.62 1,572.18
c Col (4)= col (2)* col(3)/100
Source: Comitato dell’inchiesta industriale (1873, p. 43).
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Net Protection on Steam Locomotives 
Figure 3 shows that subsequent tariff reforms—above all that of 
1887—gradually ensured a positive protection to the Italian producers 
of steam locomotives. The vertical distance between the continuous and 
dashed line provides a measure of the net-protection on steam locomo-
tives. Obviously the measure is rough for several reasons. Iron was not 
the only input in the production of a steam locomotive, though most 
relevant in terms of weight. Second, Italian import duties were mainly 
tied to weight (not to value), and thus less effective the higher the price 
of imported goods. Finally, but importantly, the inputs’ weight losses 
occurring during the production process are not considered. Including 
them would shift the dashed line upward perhaps by as much as 20–30 
percent.20 Despite these limitations, Figure 3 tentatively suggests that 
the net protection on steam locomotives became positive over time: a 
20 This percentage is suggested by the early calculations reported in Giordano (1864, p. 349), 
and con?rmed by the more detailed tables reported in the later Camera dei Deputati (1888, pp. 
52–54).
FIGURE 3
IMPORT DUTIES ON IRON AND STEAM LOCOMOTIVES: 1865–1913  
(LIRE PER 100 KG)
Source: See text.
Ciccarelli and Nuvolari874
consequence of the increase, in different proportions, both of the import 
duties on iron and locomotives. Import duties on steam locomotives were 
raised from 4 to 4.62 lire in 1871; 4.62 to 8 lire in 1873; 8 lire to 14 from 
1888. Import duties on iron were raised from 4.62 lire to 6.50 in 1888 and 
then lowered to 6.00 lire from 1892.21 
To sum up, the evidence we have discussed so far suggests that the 
structure of the tariff rather than alleged technological backwardness 
represented the main bottleneck sti?ing the expansion of the industry up 
to mid-1880s (Figure 2).22 This became less stringent as the effective rate 
of protection on steam locomotive rose in the late 1880s.23 The growth 
in production after 1885 is generally seen as the result of two policy 
changes. The ?rst is the aforementioned 1887 reform of the tariff, raising 
the import duty on steam locomotives from 8 to 14 lire per 100 kg.24 The 
second is the 5 percent clause introduced by the Railways Conventions 
of 1885, which required that locomotives procurement contracts should 
be assigned to national manufacturers if their prices were less than 5 
percent higher than the best offer of foreign competitors.25 This is a point 
of contention in the literature: several historians argued that the 5 percent 
21 Annual data on import duties are from the Movimento commerciale del Regno d’Italia, the 
of?cial historical source on Italy’s commercial ?ows. Data for the year 1874 are, for instance, 
from Ministero delle ?nanze (1875, p. 54 (locomotives) and p. 61 (iron)). Data for year 1888 are, 
for instance, from Ministero delle Finanze (1889, p. 218 (iron) and p. 256 (locomotives)). Data on 
steam locomotives are separately identi?ed starting with 1886. In the preceding years, the duties 
on steam locomotives were reported within the more general category of “steam machines.” Data 
on iron refer to “ferro di prima fabbricazione” for the years 1866–1874, to “ferro laminato o 
battuto o in verghe di più di 5 millimetri di diametro” for the years 1870–1884, and to “ferro e 
acciaio laminato o battuto o in verghe, spranghe o barre sagomate - non aventi in sezione alcun 
diametro o lato di 7 millimetri o meno” for the years after 1885. Luckily enough, overlapping 
retrospective ?gures are regularly reported in the source, allowing the reconstruction of plausible 
time-homogeneous series of import duties. Import duties for the years before 1865 were ad 
valorem and thus, for the sake of simplicity, here ignored.
22 Thus con?rming the intuition in Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2012, pp. 55–56).
23 Federico and Tena (1999) have produced a detailed set of estimates of “effective rates of 
protection” by using the technical coef?cients of three input-output tables (one for the United 
Kingdom in 1907, one for Italy in 1911, and one for Italy in 1950). Their estimates suggest that 
the effective protection rate for the mechanical engineering was probably not very different from 
zero or marginally positive over the period 1889–1913. Their estimates are therefore broadly 
consistent with the views of informed contemporaries discussed here. 
24 The 1887 tariff reform raised import duties on both iron and machines (including 
locomotives). Still the main Italian producers of steam locomotives were for the ?rst time able to 
export their products. A possible explanation is that starting with late 1880s exporting ?rms were 
exempted from the payment of duty on iron. According to Società Italiana Ernesto Breda (1908, 
p. 50), Breda exported in the 1892–1902 decade 137 steam locomotives mostly in Romania and 
Denmark (Società Italiana Ernesto Breda 1936, p. 66); Popescu (1987, p. 333). It may be worth 
noting that the Romanian market of the time was dominated by major producers such as Beyer & 
Peacock, Henschel, Maffei, and Wiener Lokomotivfabriks. 
25 Ministero dei lavori pubblici (1901, pp. 203–204); see in particular footnote 1.
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clause was probably too weak to exert a major impact (Gerschenkron 
1962, p. 371; Caizzi 1965, p. 381; and Papa 1973, pp. 50–51), but the most 
recent contributions such as Merger (1986, p. 84), Giovanni Federico and 
Renato Giannetti (1999, p. 1134), and Giannetti and Michelangelo Vasta 
(2012, p. 226) claim rather that the clause played an important role in the 
“take-off” of domestic production of steam locomotives after 1885. 
The Silent Procurement Policy, 1885–1899 
There are, however, two other features of the Railway Conventions of 
1885 that have received only limited attention in the literature, but are 
possibly far more important than the 5 percent clause and the revision 
of the tariff in accounting for the expansion of the domestic production. 
The ?rst is the special endowment of 15 million lire granted, with the 
reorganization of the railway system in 1885, to the three major operating 
companies to purchase railway equipment and material and also to renew 
their locomotive ?eet (Merger 1986, p. 81). The second is the active 
procurement policy that was put in place after 1885, which, although not 
established by law, amounted to favoritism of “national champions” well 
beyond the preference arising from the 5 percent clause. 
The point is clearly stated in an of?cial publication of the “public 
works” ministry explicitly acknowledging that a segment of the Italian 
market for locomotives was to be reserved for national manufacturers:
In the case of locomotives the protection afforded by the aforementioned article 
[i.e., the ?ve per cent clause], was not suf?cient to allow national ?rms to win 
procurement contracts and, even a higher protection would have not been enough. 
Hence, in order to encourage the Italian locomotive industry, which is still in its 
infancy and it is practiced by very few ?rms that are now constructing the plants 
necessary to win against foreign competition, several procurement contracts have 
been assigned to these ?rms by means of private deals, ?xing prices in such a way 
to allow these ?rms to manufacture locomotives without making losses and not 
making a too heavy burden for the State. (Ministero dei lavori pubblici 1889, pp. 
501–2)
The 5 percent clause introduced by the Railway Conventions of 1885 was 
to be applied to contracts assigned by means of formal competitive calls 
(“licitazione”), but the franchise companies could also procure locomo-
tives directly from the manufacturers outside of the competitive system 
as illustrated in Table 5. 
Two points merit attention. Columns 4 and 5 show clearly that the 
5 percent clause was insuf?cient to tilt the price advantage in favor of 
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national manufacturers. Second, a signi?cant stimulus to the national 
industry was implemented by means of special deals.26 In particular, from 
the Railway Conventions of 1885 to 1900, the domestic production of 
steam locomotives was assigned either by national auctions (284 units 
out of 595) or by private negotiations (311 units out of 595). To be sure, 
the price of foreign locomotives was lower than national ones, particu-
larly so in the case of locomotive awarded through direct procurement 
contracts (about 74 thousands lire against about 48 thousands lire). Most 
likely, this price differential re?ected both the possible higher ef?ciency 
of foreign producers, but also the existence of implicit agreements guar-
anteeing high prices to Italian producers. 
TABLE 5
ACQUISITIONS OF NEW LOCOMOTIVES: EXPENDITURE AND AVERAGE PRICE  
BY TYPES OF PROCUREMENT, 1885–1899
        (1) 
 
Type of  Procurement 


















 to foreigners 291 17,299,848 59,449.65 —
 to Italians   0         0 — —
National callsd: 311 24,892,467 80,040.09 1.346
Direct procurement:
 to foreigners  46  2,217,898 48,215.17 —
 to Italians 284 21,112,045 74,338.19 1.541
Total 932 65,522,258 — —
 to foreigner 337 19,517,745 57,916.16 —
 to Italians    595e 43,392,879 77,074.39 1.331
a Col. 4 = col. 3/col. 2. 
b The national to foreign price ratio was obtained (rounding errors apart) as follows: 
(80,040.09/59,449.65) = 1.346; (74,338.19/48,215.17) = 1.541; (77,074.39/57,916.16) = 1.331. 
c Open calls (“licitazioni internazionali”) were opened to both foreign and Italian producers
d National calls (“licitazioni nazionali”) were reserved for Italian producers. 
e The ?gure (595) also includes 32 locomotives built by the Mediterranea (30) and Adriatica (2) 
in their own workshops, accounting for a total value of 2,611,631.62 lire.
Source: Ministero dei lavori pubblici (1901, pp. 202–9).
26 Calzavarini (1966, p. 74) points to the key role played by “non-tariff  trade barriers” in 
compensating the “the insuf?cient protection of the trade regime.” Calzavarini’s appraisal has 
been largely neglected by the subsequent literature. For a useful discussion of non-tariff barriers, 
see Baldwin (1970). 
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The adoption of stronger protectionist measures to favor Italian 
producers appears to be a leitmotiv of the parliamentary discussions.27 
Despite various calls to exclude foreign locomotives, the government 
rejected such outright protection. However, the government agreed that, 
while the various forms of tariff protection were not suf?cient, the most 
critical issue was the irregularity of demand. Informed contemporaries 
identify in the small and irregular number of orders the main problem 
affecting the cost competitiveness of national manufacturers. In 1881 
Giuseppe Colombo wrote: 
The convenient manufacturing of steam locomotives requires a demand of at least 
50 units per year, and a workshop with the most sophisticated and specialized 
machinery. Two such workshops would probably suf?ce to supply the needs of 
whole Italian railway network. Given the methods of locomotives production 
prevailing today also in the major foreign ?rms, where many components are 
directly purchased by iron producers or other specialized manufacturers and 
… given the proved ability of Italian producers in both new productions and 
maintenances … the success of such undertaking in Italy would be, no doubt, 
possible. (Colombo 1881, p. 67)
A similar point was also stressed, a quarter century later, in the 1908 
celebratory volume for the 1,000th locomotive constructed by Breda:  
The technical dif?culties that Breda had to face daily were exacerbated by two 
key factors: the ?erce competition from foreign producers, and the irregular 
and discontinuous nature of the orders. (Società Italiana Ernesto Breda 1908,  
p. 22)
These statements suggest that more than the shield of tariff-based protec-
tion (with positive net protection effectively achieved from the late 1880s) 
it was the irregularity of demand that stymied the Italian manufacturers 
of steam locomotives during the nineteenth century.28
In this context, the Railway Conventions of 1885 played a critical 
role in reassuring the two main national manufacturers (Ansaldo and 
Breda) that the new political environment was going to be quite favorable 
to domestic producers of locomotives. This resulted in an expansion of 
27 An account of the passionate parliamentary debates on the locomotive industry at the turn 
of the century, not reported here for reasons of space, can be found in Ciccarelli and Nuvolari 
(2015). 
28 The highly irregular nature of the demand was not only a feature of the Italian market. For 
a discussion of the “feast-or-famine” nature of locomotive demand in this period in different 
countries, see Ericson (1998, pp. 133–34). 
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the productive facilities of both ?rms so that domestic production 
increased relatively swiftly from a few units to more than a hundred 
units.29 
THE BIRTH OF THE FERROVIE DELLO STATO (1905)  
AND THE NEW RAILWAYS POLICY
The late nineteenth-century parliamentary debates on railways had 
important consequences in terms of actual economic policies. The govern-
ment presented a plan concerning the acquisition of new rolling stock 
for the years 1900–1904. It was established (article 9 of law no. 57 of 
27 February 1900) that the quantity, quality, and expenditure for new 
purchases of locomotives had to be agreed between the State and the 
operating companies. Furthermore, during the same ?ve year period, the 
Government provided the companies a non-repayable grant of 28 million 
lire, reinforcing thus its role as chief sponsor of the railway sector. Not 
surprisingly, it has been remarked that the railway plan of 1900 represented 
the greater State commitment towards railway since the uni?cation (Papa 
1973, p. 50). In 1905, the 20-year contract between the State and the oper-
ating companies (the Railways Conventions of 1885) was not renewed and 
the State assumed the direct management of the railway system through 
the creation of  Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), a fully public company. 
The rules of the game were changed considerably. The new legisla-
tion established that “the Government will assign the production of new 
rolling stock to national manufacturers … safeguarding, other things 
being equal, a fair distribution among the various producers” and “when-
ever necessary … the executive manager [of the newborn FS] can disre-
gard open and national call and use private negotiations …”, but impor-
tantly, “in case of collusive behavior or any kind of fraud by national 
manufacturers to the detriment of the railway administration [that is the 
FS], or when it will not be possible for national producers to guarantee a 
fair price of rolling stock, according to the prevailing market conditions, 
then   … [the Government] …  will order new rolling stock to foreign 
producers.”30 Two points deserve attention. The ?rst is that the tool of 
direct procurement to assign orders to national producers was explicitly 
29 On the investment in production capacity (in particular in that related to the production of 
locomotives) in the pioneering years of Breda, see Licini (1994).
30 The framework of the new policy regime was established by law no. 137, April 1905 on 
“the public management of the railway sector,” and by law no. 429, July 1907, on “the State 
management of railways not licensed to private ?rms.” The citation refers to article 11 of law no. 
137, April 1905. 
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TABLE 6
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PRICES OF 403 LOCOMOTIVES ORDERED  













A. Italians (direct procurement)
  E. Breda Milano 640  20 1.78
  E. Breda Milano 320  52 1.73
  E. Breda Milano 835  10 1.73
  OM Milano 320  20 1.73
  OM Milano 851  26 1.77
  OM Saronno 600  38 1.79
  Giovanni Ansaldo Genova 600  20 1.79
  Giovanni Ansaldo Genova 630  25 1.80
  Giovanni Ansaldo Genova 640   9 1.78
  Giovanni Ansaldo Genova 870  40 1.85
  Giovanni Ansaldo Genova 910  30 1.78
  E. Breda Milano —  6 NA
  Giovanni Ansaldo Genova —  10 NA
 Total unitsa:  — 291 —
 Average price: 1.77
B. Foreign (international auctions)
  Maffei – Monacob 851  16 1.43
  Ungarische S.B. Budapest 600   9 1.48
  Sigl, Wiener Neustdat 600  24 1.65
  Hartmann – Chemnitz 600  12 1.65
  Società Alsaziana Grafenstadt 600   9 1.68
  M. Fabrik Esslingen 600   9 1.68
  Schwazkopff – Berlino 600   9 1.70
  Energie Marcinelle 600  12 1.72
  Henschel – Cassel 630  12 1.72
 Total units: — 112 —
 Average price: — — 1.63
 Average price of best offersc: — — 1.56
a The total does not include one locomotive ordered to Breda and one to Ansaldo to be exhibited 
during the Milan 1906 exposition (Camera dei Deputati 1906a, p. 11).
b A few locomotives were sold by Maffei at the price of 1.50 lire per kg (Camera dei Deputati 
1906a, p. 12). 
cFollowing Camera dei Deputati (1906c, p. 13), and article 34 of Law 429 7 July 1907 on the 
“State management of the railway sector”) the average price of best offers is equal to 1.56 lire per 
kg and computed as  (1.43+1.48+1.65 +1.68)/4.
Source: See text.
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institutionalized. The second is that the State intended to use international 
auctions as a threat to limit “extortionary” pricing by national producers.31
While the protection of the national industry was thus con?rmed 
and even reinforced, a more rigorous expenditure policy was put in 
place.
Tables 6 and 7 document the effects of the new FS regime on loco-
motive acquisitions and prices. Table 6 provides quantity and price data 
from an of?cial 1906 report.32 A total of 291 locomotives were assigned 
to national producers by direct procurement contracts, and 112 to foreign 
producers through international auctions. Table 7 provides an assessment 
of the price gap between national and foreign manufacturers in 1906. It 
shows that by 1906 the price gap was only about 9 percent, signi?cantly 
lower than in the 1885–1899 period.33
TABLE 7
PRICE OF 403 LOCOMOTIVES ORDERED IN JANUARY 1906,  
AND TO BE DELIVERED BETWEEN JULY 1906 AND JUNE 1907
(1) 
Price (lire per kg)
(2) 
National/Foreign Price
Italian locomotives 1.77 —
(via direct procurement)
Foreign locomotives 1.63 1.086
(via open calls)
Source: Camera dei Deputati (1906a, p. 5).
31 Direct procurement contracts were rarely used to import locomotives from abroad. The 
Minister of public works Carmine mentions for instance the case of “unusual” private negotiations 
with foreign producers concerning 25 locomotives (Camera dei Deputati 1906b, p. 6652). 
32 The report of March 1906 to the Parliament by the Minister of public works Pietro Carmine 
(the so called “Carmine-report,” Camera dei Deputati 1906a). 
33 The price ratio between national and foreign locomotives reported in Table 7 can be 
used to perform a tentative estimation of the total factor productivity (TFP) gap in steam 












 where A = TFP levels; W= real wages; R = rental cost of 
capital; C = raw materials and ?, ?, and ? are the shares of labor, capital, and raw material in 
total costs. The suf?x * indicates the foreign country. Assuming that the rental cost of capital 
was the same in the two countries, using the data in Table 3 to estimate cost shares, data on real 
wages from Allen (2001), and on the price of iron (which approximates the raw materials) from 
Cianci (1933, pp. 329–30), one gets that the level of TFP in Italy was about 85 percent of the 
German level. Taking into account the crude nature of the data, the assumptions made, and that 
the extent to which the prices reported in Table 7 were subjected to political manipulation remains 
uncertain, these estimates provide only a very rough indication of the TFP gap between the two 
countries.
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To summarize, with the creation of the FS in 1905, the State imple-
mented a new policy mix capable to stimulate the national industry, 
by directly assigning to local producers new locomotive orders, and, at 
the same time, to safeguard the State budget by linking the price effec-
tively paid to national producers to the best offers of foreign producers.34 
Foreign purchases were used to investigate the price of locomotives and 
to absorb demand peaks, as the one occurred in 1907–1908 when about 
900 locomotives entered the FS locomotive ?eet.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Notwithstanding the limited endowment of the country in terms of engi-
neering competences, the Italian steam locomotive industry achieved a 
level of technological sophistication in line with that of foreign producers 
by the beginning of the twentieth century. The early development of the 
industry was slowed both by the vagaries of the demand which prevented 
the major national players from planning an ordered expansion of produc-
tive capacity and, secondly, by tariff protection on iron products, which 
resulted in a cost disadvantage. From 1885 onwards national manufac-
turers received considerable support through a discretionary procure-
ment policy which in practical terms amounted to an effective “non-tariff 
barrier” and to a more regular demand for their products, tied to the spread 
of the railways network leading to greater economies of scale. 
The design and construction of locomotives were probably among the 
most sophisticated segments of the nineteenth century mechanical engi-
neering industry and it is instructive to compare the performance of the 
locomotive industry with other less sophisticated branches such as cotton 
textile machinery where the country was unable to develop any autono-
mous production (Besso 1910, pp. 142–43; A’Hearn 1998). Yet, there 
were also other complex engineering products in which Italy was also 
able to deliver a very good performance, such as the production of war-
ships (Fenoaltea 2011, p. 150), some of which were even exported. This 
somewhat paradoxical outcome can be explained taking into account that 
some of the most sophisticated branches of the mechanical engineering 
could endure the negative effects of the tariff, by virtue of non-tariff trade 
barriers such as public procurement, subsidies, and other similar policies, 
whereas the less sophisticated branches had to bear its full burden.
34 For a more detailed discussion on the procedures to determine the price of steam locomotives 
after 1905 see Ciccarelli and Nuvolari (2015).
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Appendix A 
The Steam Locomotives Dataset
The steam locomotives dataset is based on two major components. The ?rst one is 
constructed with the same approach and sources used in Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (2012) 
for their statistical reconstruction of Italy’s rail-guided vehicles industry.35 The second 
component is entirely new and covers indicators of technical characteristics and perfor-
mances of locomotives. 
The main source for the ?rst component of the dataset is constituted by the catalogues 
of the principal companies operating the railways system at different moments in time. 
Catalogues of this kind were published from the late 1880s by three main operating 
companies (Rete Adriatica (RA), the Rete Mediterranea (RM), and the Rete Sicula 
(RS)).36 A similar catalogue was published in 1914 by the Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), 
providing an exhaustive list of locomotives in operating service at the date of 30 June 
1914.37 The catalogues set out the technical characteristics of each type of locomotive 
in service together with a numerical identi?er, the year of construction, and the name of 
the building company. Our dataset is constructed by merging the relevant quantitative 
information stored in these four publications. 
The second component of the dataset concerns technical features. For each locomo-
tive model (Gruppo FS) we have retrieved the information on locomotives’ weight and 
power (measured in HP) from Cornolò (1998, pp. 584–99). 
The WHP calculations presented in the previous Patterns of technical change section 
refer to 4,432 steam locomotives with separated tenders; the remaining 1,268 tank-
locomotives (locomotives carrying water and coal on board instead of pulling them 
behind in a separated tender), with a WHP far higher and well above 100, are excluded.38 
Locomotives in our sample are grouped according to a classi?cation scheme adopted by 
the Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) in 1905. 
Table A1 illustrates the distribution of locomotives in our sample by (104) loco-
motive groups. The table includes two panels. Panel A includes locomotive groups 
from 100 to 560; these are mostly of “?rst-generation” (i.e., using single expansion 
and saturated, or “wet” steam). Panel B refers to groups from 600 to 980, and includes 
mostly “second generation” locomotives (i.e., adopting super-heating and/or double-
expansion). The table’s columns are numbered as follows. Odd numbers refer to loco-
motive groups. Even numbers refer to the units of locomotives within a given group. 
Locomotive groups included in the same column are similar in terms of technical char-
acteristics (speed, power, weight, wheels arrangement, etc.). The bottom part of Table 
A1, panels A and B report the average sample weight, the average sample power, and 
the power-to-weight-ratio evaluated at the sample average. 
35 A complete account (in Italian) on sources and methods can be found in Ciccarelli and 
Fenoaltea (2014).
36 Società Italiana per le Strade Ferrate Meridionali. Esercizio della Rete Adriatica (1887 ca), 
Società Italiana per le Strade Ferrate del Mediterraneo (1888), and Società italiana per le Strade 
Ferrate della Sicilia (1902 ca).  
37 Ferrovie dello Stato (1914).
38 We do not consider in our sample tank-locomotives because they are typically of reduced size 
and weight, and often operating in narrow gauge lines (Ministero dei lavori pubblici 1901, pp. 
200–1, where the tank-locomotives are classi?ed as a category apart, with an average price well 
below that of standard locomotives). 
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TABLE A1
STEAM LOCOMOTIVES OPERATING IN ITALY, 1850–1914, BY GROUPa
A. FS Groups 100–500: First Generation Machines
Locomotives with Separated Tender




















   100 12 200 56 310 C 69 400 13 500 18 
   102 8 206 64 320 201 410 25 510 142 
   103 5 215 394 380 50 420 293 530 72 
   111 8 255 C 6 385 19 450 8 540 18 
   112 8 260 24 388  3 451 72 545 46 
   113 25 265 30 390 9 470 143 550 18 
   116 5 268 10 391 28 499 6 552 36 
   118 7 269 6 395 5 560 31 
   120 156 270 130 396 5 
   136 27 290 338  397 3 
   140 70 
   155 39 
   164 25 
   170 73 
   180 4 
   183 12 
   185 41
   190 97 
asw 34,777 41,273 41,357 60,304 44,255 
ashpc 378 461 457 711 529 
whpasc 92 90 90 85 84 
min yeard 1853 1861 1857 1853 1878 
max yeard 1889 1913 1908 1912 1901 
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TABLE A1 (CONTINUED)
B. FS Groups 600–900: Second-Generation Machines
Locomotives with Separated Tender Tank-Locomotivesb
          (1)















   600 C    248 720     10 800     18 900     18 
   625 S     98   730 C    190   801 C      9 902     12 
   630 C    100   740 S    135 802      3 905     84 
   640 S    169   745 S      4 803      6   910 C     54 
   650     55     750 C,S     40 805     46 950      6 
   656 C     25 810     13   980 C     12 
   660 C     51 813     12 
   666 C     10 815      2 
   670 C     43 816     38 
   680 C,S    151  817      4
   685 S    66 820      1 
   690 S     24 821      4
 822      2
 825     12
 827     20
829     6
830     44
  835    286
848      2
849      2
850      5
  851    207
870    168 
875     55
  885 C     16
895     89
  898      5
899      7
aswc 60,179 66,531 43,044 58,857
ashpc    860    932    380    576
whpsac     69    71    113    102
min yeard   1884   1902   1850   1886
max yeard   1914   1914   1914   1913
a The table includes 5,700 steam locomotives operating in the standard-gauge (1,435 meters) 
Italian railway network. The C and S letters attached to groups’ number denote respectively 
double-expansion and super-heating. The remaining cases consist of more traditional locomotives 
using saturated steam and simple expansion.
b Groups FS 800 to 899 and 900 to 980 only include tank-locomotives (for a total of 1,268 units) 
and are not included in the evaluation of the WHP index illustrated in the main text.
c asw: average sample weight; aswp: average sample horse power; whpsa: weight-to-power ratio 
evaluated at sample average. 
d  min year: ?rst entry year in the sample; max year: last entry year in the sample. 
Source: See text.
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